The United States with its planned withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014 has the opportunity to reset its approach to democracy building in Afghanistan. The democracy building record of the United States in Afghanistan at best can be considered as patchy because of its over militaristic approach aimed at promoting legitimacy for Islamicist rule in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014 offers the United States a chance to redeem itself before the intentional community and the people of Afghanistan by helping them return back to the democratic path it was on before the Islamicist takeover in 1992.
The original goal of the United States with its intervention in Afghanistan according to Amin Saikal of the ANU was to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban by transforming Afghanistan into ‘a stable, secure and viable democracy’. The United States has clearly failed to achieve any of these goals after almost 13 years of its occupation of Afghanistan. According to Saikal the U.S. intervention has faced several major issues which has led to its policy failure, such as the distraction of the Iraq invasion, the return of the Taliban, the support of the Taliban by the Pakistan regime, the ability of Hekmatyr’s Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani network to disturb the Karzai led regime. The corrupt nature of the Karzai regime and most of all the incomprehensible nature of the U.S. policy approach towards Afghanistan according to Saikal has been responsible for the failure of democracy building attempts since 2001.
Saikal describes the United States as making a series of policy errors that are ‘inappropriate, incoherent, contradictory and confused’ without taking into consideration Afghanistan’s place in the South Asian and the Middle Eastern orders. He also points to the historical factors that have traditionally dogged democracy building in Afghanistan with internal order and external interference being a large determinational factor in Afghanistan’s national politics. Saikal also described how Karzai’s has sort ‘to perpetuate many of Afghanistan’s past political norms, practices and modes opernadi to maintain power’ which has helped further undermine democracy building policy development in Afghanistan by maintaining a strong authoritarian regime seated in Kabul and supported by the U.S. military.
Peter Burnell has stated that political strategies to promote democracy are varied with democracy itself being ‘a heavily contested and value-laden’ conceptualisation with differing views about whether democratisation is a purely political pursuit or whether other factors like economic opportunity should be taken into consideration. Burnell has defined several factors that help aid the development of political democratisation which could be of value to the Untied States if it was to make a genuine attempt to help aid the democratisation of Afghanistan. These defining features being:
Free and fair elections based on universal suffrage.
Political liberalisation through civil society ventures.
Commitment to the Rule of Law.
Burnell also noted that the engagement of external parties can have a greater influence in democracy building attempts with governmental both regional and interregional, party-independent and non-governmental organisation, commercial and not for-profit organisations can all have an influence on democracy building attempts. He is of the opinion that joint cooperation between the United States and Europe can provide help greater legitimacy to democracy building attempts.
William Byrd in a special report for the United States Institute of Peace argues that the source of current issues for Afghanistan, i.e. foreign occupation, civil war and insurgency date back to 1978 with the Saur (Taurus) Revolution. To add to these Byrd also describes how Afghanistan’s divergent ethnic and cultural mix the national identity of Afghanistan has been forged in a theatre of war against a series of empires from Persia, India, Great Britain, Russia and now the United States with Afghanistan’s last peaceful handover of power happening in 1933. The political culture and With military interventions having a low rate if success in implementing democratic reforms, the military based intervention by the United States since 2001 in Afghanistan has fuelled similar domestic issues to the intervention by the Soviet union in the 1980s.
Byrd has shown that there have been similar issues faced by both the United States and the Soviet Union in their militaristic attempts to promote freedom in Afghanistan;
Strong local reaction to over ambitious reforms.
Excessive optimism in expecting objectives to be obtained within a short timeframe.
The inability to exert strong control over local politicians.
Sanctuary for Islamicist extremists and military assistance from Pakistan.
The impossibility of a military solution to the issues of Afghanistan despite the presence of a significant level of forces and a brutal approach to counterinsurgency.
With the United States is following the footsteps of the Soviet Union with it withdrawal from Afghanistan by leaving behind as advisors and supplies it is hoping not to achieve the same results with the resulting power vacuum being filled by the Islamo-Fascists of the Taliban.
Since 1978 the militaristic approach adopted by the United States has not been that supports the promotion of democracy but one that promote its own interests ahead of the interest of the people of Afghanistan. The United States with its intervention in 2001 has sort to concentrate of promoting legitimacy of a Pashtu based Islamacism at the expense of democracy promotion efforts in Afghanistan as it attempted to defeat militaristically both al-Qaeda and remnants fighters from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The current approach to supporting governance in Afghanistan the United States is based upon the promotion of religious authoritarianism through the imposition of a U.S. Monopoly of Violence through the application of policies found in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
Assistant Professor of Military Science Major Stanley Wiecknik argues that the issues with the Counterinsurgency Field Manual and its application in Afghanistan as U.S. Policy were the low priority given to establishing political legitimacy for the host governments amongst local populations. Wiechnik also highlights the most significant issue when it comes to implementing U.S. policy in Afghanistan is that the military can only provide two types of governance either coercive or authoritarian. The failure by the United States of its over militaristic approach in fighting a counterinsurgency war is that it favours a top down authoritarian model instead of a grass roots bottom participatory approaches that help empower ordinary citizens and rejects any attempt at democracy building in Afghanistan.
Major John Broam of the Air Command and Staff College in a report has agreed with Major Wiechnik’s rejection of democracy promotion policies in Afghanistan in favour of supporting the promotion of legitimacy for Islamicist government. Broam in his report stated that the West’s continued expectation on regards to its attempts at democracy promotion project in Afghanistan that expectations should be lowered due to its Islamicist political culture and low economic status. He stated that a legitimised regime can help provide better for the people then the contrived failures of imposed Western style democracy. Whilst the application of Broam’s views may see the U.S. Army achieve its military mission in a quicker time frame, they do not however help promote democracy building in Afghanistan. The 1992 United Nations backed agreement which saw the transition of power from a Soviet backed PDPA regime to a U.S. support Islamicist government led by Rabbani developed into the Civil War 1992-1996 which ended with the Islamo-Fascist Taliban takeover of Kabul which led directly to the training of al-Qaeda sponsored terrorists to commit the 2011atrocities in the United States on September 11.
The low economic base according to Broam in Afghanistan with the lack of an economic industrial base and an educated working class are holding back the potential for democratic development. The low level of industrial development in Afghanistan has led to an inability of the Afghan political economy to provide the capital needs for the urbanisation of Afghanistan’s rural population from which the Taliban and other Islamicists draw the support and membership from. These factors has left Afghanistan dependent of the political economy and industrial base of its regional neighbours such as Iran, Pakistan, India, China as Russia. Broam suggested that an important step for the United States ahead of its withdrawal combat troops in 2014 is to actively seek the engagement of these important regional partners in Afghanistan’s political economy.
Both Wiecknik & Broam’s papers show the divide that exists between military and civil approaches when it comes to the United States’ hegemonic endeavour in Afghanistan. The difference in approaches also extends into the field in Afghanistan with the military’s legitimacy building approach for the regimes undermining the democracy promotion work of the State Department and Independent aid groups such as the USAID and the USIP.
Chris Rowe describes democratic government as having contested elections, a free press and the separation of powers but after 13 years of U.S. occupation Afghanistan none of these democratic norms in theory or practice. Afghanistan according to Rowe is still being ruled by the same tribal militia’s that took control of Afghanistan after the handover of power under a United Nations accord in 1992. Despite claims to be leading an open government with democratic elections the Karzai government with the assistance of the United States military continues increasing restrictions on neo-leftists, secularist, nationalist and pro-democratic parties especially those 25 or so political groupings formed out of the breakup of the PDPA in 1992 whilst at the same time trying to encourage the Islamo-Fascist’s of the Taliban, Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network to form a coalition with him ahead of the 2014 elections.
A new and exciting policy option for U.S. Policy after its withdrawal of combat troops from, Afghanistan in 2014 is the potential application of Principled Engagement in Afghanistan which would make a good test case for the vibrant conceptualisation process which requires ‘transitional states that show at least a rhetorical commitment to democracy and human rights’. Pedersen & Kinley described the concept of Principles Engagement as a middle ground approach between Ostracism and Business as Usual approaches that combines ‘normative pressure with positive support to affect incremental governance reform’ which Pedersen & Kinley believe that ‘may well be the most effective approach in many of the most repressive states’.
There are also other non-direct approaches in which the United States can undertake to help promote democracy and freedom in Afghanistan. Sherlock in his Carnegie Paper has outlined some measures that have proven effective for democracy promotion;
Providing advice and assistance to pro-democracy forces, political parties and civil institutions.
Providing technical assistance and capability-building.
Direct and politicised interventions such as speeches from key U.S. leaders and officials and motions in international forums such as the United Nations.
Extending bilateral and multilateral pressure of governments to reform.
Assisting exile groups and the granting of asylum to prominent dissidents.
Diplomatic and economic sanctions.
Providing financial or military assistance to rebels groups.
Direct military interventions.
Sherlock also noted that the taking of any of these actions is a highly political approach that would require the United States to make a firm commitment to democracy building in Afghanistan due to the potential for have these policies backfire. An example of ill thought out policies that have backfired can be seen in Reagan’s decision to support Islamicists to fight the PDPA regime which lead to the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington.
The main problem democracy building by the United States is that most of the 25 or so secular, nationalist and pro-democracy parties in Afghanistan have their origins in the various factions of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan which ruled Afghanistan form 1978 to 1992. The major issue with the current U.S. militaristic approach to Afghanistan is the fact that most of these secular, nationalist and pro-democratic parties have been officially banned from running in Afghanistan’s limited elections with U.S. support. The irony of the U.S. approach towards Afghanistan is that I they were to follow the example of their European counterparts and attempt to forge a common front of secular, nationalist and pro-democracy opposition groups and parties they would need to embrace the former loyalists of the PDPA regime which they have spent the best part of 40 to 50 years, billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars and cost the lives of many U.S. soldiers as well as millions of Afghani citizens out of power in Afghanistan for ideological reasons.
The development of such a logical approach to democracy building of Afghanistan would be inconceivable for the U.S. military that have spent the best part of the last 40 to 50 years attempting to build the legitimacy for a coalition of Islamicist groups in Afghanistan. Through the training and sponsorship of Islamicist and Islamo-Fascist groups in Afghanistan like the Taliban Hekmatyr’s Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani Network’s and Rabbani’s Jamiat-i-Islami the United States military has been the major contributor who has hampered the development of democratic reform in Afghanistan.
So therefore in conclusion if the United States to maximise the democracy building opportunity presented by the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops in 2014 it needs to look at radically changing its strategic approach to democracy building in Afghanistan. The first and foremost change it needs to look at is abandoning the counterinsurgency based policy which has actively supported the development of legitimacy for Islamicists for around the last 40-50 years. Secondly the United States can embrace the policies outlined by Sherlock and start to actively support all the neo-leftist, secular, nationalist and pro-democracy groups in Afghanistan, including the 25 or so that grew out the collapse of the former PDPA led regime. The United States should also work towards building a coalition of non-Islamicists parties to take of the current authoritarian and illiberal regime in Afghanistan similar to the projects current under way by the European Union, India and Russia. Such a regime would be based upon the democratic principles as outlined by Burnell of free elections, political liberalisation and the rule of law.
The United States in conjunction with such a government could then help Afghanistan’s political economy by helping to establish an industrial base so that urbanisation and the development of a class conscience proletariat as the dominant class can take place. The establishment of political dominance for a newly emerging working class would have the ability not only the challenge the dominance of Afghanistan agrarian class which produce drugs and recruits of the Taliban. It would also keep in check the aspirations of foreign funded Islamicists who with the compliance of the U.S. military have oppressed the human rights of the people of Afghanistan ever since the U.N. sponsored transfer of power in 1992.
The United States as the world’s last superpower can also choose to engage with other like minded states in applying what Pedersen & Kinley call Principled Engagement to help bring about progressive change in the current authoritarian regime. The United States with its withdrawal of combat troops in 2014 if it serious about the promotion of democracy and freedom in Afghanistan has the opportunity to engage constructively in promoting a progressive future for Afghanistan but to do this it first needs to admit and then correct their policy errors of the past. These errors were based upon it application of an over militarised response to political issues, an approach that has not only failed to help promote democracy in Afghanistan but has led to the terrorism inflicted by Islamo-Fascism on the people of Afghanistan finding its way to the United States in 2001 with the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.
by Justin Arnold
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